The object of this paper is to study the mean-variance portfolio optimization in continuous time. Since this problem is time inconsistent we attack it by placing the problem within a game theoretic framework and look for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategies. This particular problem has already been studied in [2] where the authors assumed a constant risk aversion parameter. This assumption leads to an equilibrium control where the dollar amount invested in the risky asset is independent of current wealth, and we argue that this result is unrealistic from an economic point of view. In order to have a more realistic model we instead study the case when the risk aversion is allowed to depend dynamically on current wealth. This is a substantially more complicated problem than the one with constant risk aversion but, using the general theory of time inconsistent control developed in [4], we provide a fairly detalied anaysis on the general case. We also study the particular case when the risk aversion is inversely proportional to wealth, and for this case we provide an analytic solution where the equilibrium dollar amount invested in the risky asset is proportional to current wealth. The equilibrium for this model thus appears more reasonable than the one for the model with constant risk aversion.
Introduction
Mea-variance (MV) analysis for optimal asset allocation is one of the classical results of financial economics. After the original publication in [14] , a vast number of papers have been published on this topic. Most of these papers deal with the single period case, and there is a very good reason for this: It is very easy to see that an MV optimal portfolio problem in a multi period framework is time inconsistent in the sense that the Bellman Optimality Principle does not hold. As a consequence, dynamic programming cannot be easily applied, and it is in fact not at all clear what one should mean by the term "optimal".
In the literature there are two basic ways of handling (various forms of) time inconsistency in optimal control problems. One possibility is to study the pre-committed problem, where "optimal" is interpreted as "optimal from the point of view of time zero". Kydland and Prescott [10] indeed argue that a precommitted strategy may be economically meaningful in certain circumstances. In the context of MV portfolio choice, [17] is probably the earliest paper that studies a pre-committed MV model in a continuous-time setting (although he considers only one single stock with a constant risk-free rate), followed by [1] . In a discrete-time setting, [11] developed an embedding technique to change the originally time-inconsistent MV problem into a stochastic LQ control problem. This technique was extended in [21] , along with an indefinite stochastic linearquadratic control approach, to the continuous-time case. Further extensions and improvements are carried out in, among many others, [13] , [12] , [3] , and [20] . Markowitz's problem with transaction cost is recently solved in [5] . Note that in all these works only pre-committed strategies have been derived.
Another possibility is to take the time inconsistency more seriously and study the problem within a game theoretic framework. This is in fact the approach of the present paper. One possible interpretation of the time inconsistency is that our preferences change in a temporally inconsistent way as time goes by, and we can thus view the MV problem as a game, where the players are the future incarnations of our own preferences. We then look for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium point for this game.
The game theoretic approach to addressing general time inconsistency via Nash equilibrium points has a long history starting with [18] where a deterministic Ramsay problem is studied. Further work along this line in continuous and discrete time is provided in [8] , [9] , [15] , [16] , and [19] .
Recently there has been renewed interest in these problems. In the interesting papers [6] and [7] , the authors consider optimal consumption and investment under hyperbolic discounting in deterministic and stochastic models from the above game theoretic point of view. To our knowledge, these papers were the first to provide a precise definition of the game theoretic equilibrium concept in continuous time.
In the particular case of MV analysis, the game theoretic approach to time inconsistency was first studied (in discrete and continuous time) in [2] , where the authors undertake a deep study of the problem within a Wiener driven framework. The case of multiple assets, as well as the case of a hidden Markov process driving the parameters of the asset price dynamics are also treated. The authors derive an extension of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and manages, by a number of very clever ideas, to solve this equation explicitly for the basic problem, and also for the above mentioned extensions. The methodology of [2] is, among other things, to use a "total variance formula", which partially extends the standard iterated expectations formula. This works very nicely in the MV case, but drawback of this particular approach is that it seems quite hard to extend the results to other objective functions than MV.
The first paper to treat the game theoretic approach to time inconsistency in more general terms was [4] where the authors consider a fairly general class of (time inconsistent) objective functions and a very general controlled Markov process. Within this framework the authors derive an extension of the standard dynamic programming equation, to a system of equations (which in the diffusion case is a system of non linear PDEs). The framework of [4] is general enough to include many previously known models of time inconsistency.
Going back to the MV portfolio optimization, there is a non trivial problem connected with the solution presented in [2] . In the problem formulation of [2] , the MV objective function at time t, given current wealth X t = x, is given by
where X T is the wealth at the end of the time period, and where γ is a given constant representing the risk aversion of the agent. For such a model it turns out (see [2] ) that the dollar amount u(t, x) invested at time t in the risky asset is of the form
where h is a deterministic function of time. In particular this implies that the dollar amount invested in the risky asse does not depend on current wealth x. In our opinion this result is economically unreasonable, since it implies that you will invest the same number of dollars in the stock if your wealth is 100 dollars as you would if your wealth is 100.000.000 dollars. See Section 3.2 for a more detailed discussion.
The deeper reason for this anomaly is the fact that the risk aversion parameter γ is assumed to be a constant; and hence the obvious implication is that we should explicitly allow γ to depend on current wealth.
The main goal of the present paper is precisely to study MV problems with a state dependent risk aversion. More explicitly we consider an objective function of the form
where γ is a deterministic function of present wealth x. This type of problem cannot easily be treated within the framework of [2] , but it is a simple special case of the theory developed in [4] . The structure and main result of the present paper are as follows. In Section 2 we present our formal model. We discuss the time inconsistency of the mean variance problem and we place that problem within the general framework of [4] . The game theoretic problem is presented, both in informal and in mathematically precise terms, and from [4] we cite the general theoretical results that we need for our analysis.
In Section 3 we give a brief recapitulation of the MV problem with constant γ studied in [2] , and we use our general theory to derive the solution. In Section 4 we study the MV problem with state dependent risk aversion using the theory developed in [4] . We start by deriving a surprisingly explicit solution for the case of a general risk aversion γ(x). We then specialize to the economically natural case of γ(x) = γ/x and for this case we obtain an analytic solution. More precisely, we show that the optimal dollar amountû t to invest in the risky asset at time t is given byû
where the deterministic function c solves an integral equation. This is the main result of the paper, and it shows that with the proper specification of the risk aversion γ(x), the optimal solution is indeed economically reasonable.
We finish the paper by proving that the integral equation for c admits a unique solution, and we also provide a numerical algorithm for the determination of c. The algorithm is implemented for some natural parameter combinations and we present graphs for illustrative purposes.
The basic framework
In this section we present the basic model, and we also formulate the problem under consideration.
The model
Our basic setup is a standard Black-Scholes model for a risky stock with GBM price dynamics and a bank account with constant risk free short rate r. Denoting the stock price by S and the bank account by B, the dynamics are as follows under the objective probability measure P .
Here W is a standard P -Wiener process, and the constants α, σ, and r are assumed to be known. In the analysis below, we will study self-financing portfolios (with zero consumption), based on S and B. Denoting the dollar value invested in the risky asset at time t by u t , the value process X of the portfolio is easily seen to have dynamics given by
The basic problem
Loosely speaking, the problem to be solved is to maximize utility of final wealth, where the utility is of MV form, i.e. we want to maximize the expression
where γ is a pre-specified risk aversion parameter. A disturbing property of this optimization problem is that it is time inconsistent. More precisely, let us consider a fixed but arbitrary point in time t with 0 ≤ t ≤ T and a fixed but arbitrary wealth x. Now consider the problem P t,x of maximizing the expression
where lower case index t, x indicates the initial condition. It is then easy to see that the family of subproblems P t,x are time inconsistent in the sense that the Bellman optimality principle does not hold. In other words, suppose that we find an optimal portfolioû for the problem P 0,x0 , and suppose furthermore that we use this portfolio on the interval [0, t]. Thenû is not optimal for the problem P t,Xt . In particular this implies that we cannot attack this problem by using straightforward Dynamic Programming (DynP). The "reason" for the time inconsistency is basically as follows. In order to obtain a time consistent problem it is well known that we are allowed to have an arbitrary objective function of the form
where F is an arbitrary non-linear utility function. In other words we are allowed to maximize the expected value of a non-linear function of final wealth. In the MV case, however, the objective function has the form
where
From a DynP point of view, the term E [F (X T )] is standard and causes no problems. The term G (E [X T ]), however, is non standard. It is not an expected value of a non-linear function of final wealth, but instead a non-linear function of the expected value of final wealth. Thus the time consistency is destroyed. The lack of time consistency leads to conceptual as well as computational problems. From a conceptual point of view, it is no longer clear what we mean by the word "optimal", since a control strategy which is optimal for one choice of starting point in time will generically not be optimal at a later point in time. On the other hand, even with certain precise definition of optimality, we also have a computational problem, since DynP is no longer available.
There are at least two approaches to the conceptual problem.
• We fix one initial point, like for example (0, x 0 ), and then try to find the control lawû which maximizes
We then simply disregard the fact that at a later points in time the control lawû will not be optimal. This is known as pre-commitment.
• We take the time inconsistency seriously and formulate the problem in game theoretic terms.
In this paper we will use the game theoretic formulation.
The game theoretic formulation
In order to formulate the game theoretic version of our problem, we will follow [4] , where the reader may find full proofs of all cited results. To see the structure of the problem a bit more clearly we will consider a more general and abstract problem than the MV problem above. This will also allow us to treat the case with a state dependent γ below. We thus consider a controlled n-dimensional SDE of the form
where W is P -Wiener. The adapted control u is restricted to takes values in U ⊆ R k . We restrict ourselves to feedback control laws, i.e. the controls are of the form u t = u(t, X t ) where the control law u : R + × R n → R k is a deterministic function of the two variables t and x. The solution of the SDE above, using the control law u will be denoted by X u . For a fixed initial point (t, x) we consider a functional of the form
where F (x, y) and G(x, y) are given deterministic functions. We see that with the choice of the functional above, time inconsistency enters at several different points. Firstly we have the appearance of the present state x = X t in the functions F and G, and this leads to time inconsistency since it implies that, as the state process X changes, our preferences change accordingly. Secondly, in the term
we have, even without the presence of x, a nonlinear function G acting on the conditional expectation, and this again leads to time inconsistency.
In order to define our game we now make the interpretation that at every point in time t we have one player -player number t -which we will denote by P t . Conceptually we may think of this as game with an infinite number of distinct players -one at each point in time. Alternatively you may think of the game as a game with one "real" player namely yourself, and P t as the incarnation of your own preferences at time t.
Given a control law u, the reward function for P t is given by J(t, x, u), where J obviously only depends on the control law u restricted to the time interval [t, T ].
In a first attempt to define the game, we may think of player P t choosing the control law at time t, i.e. P t chooses the function x → u(t, x). We thus see that the reward to P t depends on the action taken by P t , but also on the choices u(s, ·) made by the players P s for all s ∈ (t, T ]. We can now loosely define the concept of a "subgame perfect Nash equilibrium point" of the game. This is a control lawû satisfying, for each t, the following condition:
• Choose an arbitrary point t in time.
• Suppose that every player s, for all s > t, will use the strategyû(s, ·).
• Then the optimal choice for player t, given the objective functional J defined above, is that he/she also uses the strategyû(t, ·).
Based on this we now give the formal definition of an equilibrium control.
Definition 2.1 Given a control lawû, construct a control law u h by
we say thatû is an equilibrium control law. The equilibrium value function V is defined by
We note that in the case of a standard time consistent setting, the definition of an equilibrium will coincide with the definition of an optimal strategy and the equilibrium value function will be the usual optimal value function.
As a special case of the results on [4] we can now define the appropriate extension of the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. The operator A u below is the usual controlled infinitesimal operator defined by
The extended HJB system of equations for the Nash equilibrium problem is defined as follows.
Hereû is the control law which realizes the supremum in the first equation, and f y , G g, and Hg are defined by
We now have some comments on the extended HJB system.
• The first point to notice is that we have a system of deterministic recursion equations for the simultaneous determination of V (t, x), f(t, x, y) and g(t, x).
• In the case when F (x, y) does not depend upon x, and there is no G term, the problem trivializes to a standard time consistent problem. The terms
in the V -equation cancel, and the system reduces to the standard Bellman equation
• We have the probabilistic interpretations
• The equations for g and f y state that the processes g(t, Xû t ) and f y (t, Xû t ) are martingales.
We finish this section by citing the Verification Theorem from [4] . This shows that if you mange to solve the (deterministic) extended HJB system, then you have in fact solved your game.
Theorem 2.1 (Verification Theorem) Assume that V , f, g is a solution of the extended system in Definition 2.2, and that the control lawû realizes the supremum in the equation. Thenû is an equilibrium law, and V is the corresponding value function. Furthermore, f and g can be interpreted according to (1)-(2).
We will now use this result to analyze two versions of the MV portfolio optimization problem. We will also need the following simple corollary.
Corollary 2.1 Consider a functional
and denote the equilibrium control and value function byû and V respectively. Let ϕ be a given deterministic real valued function and consider the functional
Denoting the equilibrium control and value function byû ϕ and V ϕ respectively we haveû
3 Mean-variance with constant risk aversion
In this section we will study and solve the simplest case of MV portfolio optimization with constant risk aversion. After deriving the result we will discuss it from an economic perspective and we will find that it is not economically reasonable. In Section 4 we will therefore extend the "naive" MV problem to a more realistic one where γ is allowed to depend on current wealth x.
Stating and solving the problem
The problem is already presented in Section 2.2. To recall, the state dynamics are given by dX t = [rX t + (α − r) u t ] dt + σu t dW t and the reward function to player number t is given by
We can re-write our objective functional as
This problem is the main object of study in [2] . where the authors completely solve the MV problem above and they also study and solve a number of extensions of the basic problem.
In order to exemplify the general technique of the extended HJB equation above we will now use the framework of [4] to reproduce the results of [2] .
The extended HJB equation is given by the following PDE system:
where lower case index denotes the corresponding partial derivative. After some simple calculations we obtain the following system (which is also derived, using other arguments, in [2] )
Given the linear structure of the dynamics, as well as of the boundary conditions, it is natural to make the Ansatz
After a few routine calculations it turns out that we have separation of variables (see [4] for details) and we easily obtain the following result. • The optimal amount of money invested in a stock is given bŷ u(t, x) = 1 γ α − r σ 2 e −r(T −t) .
• The equilibrium value function is given by
• The expected value of the optimal portfolio is given by
Discussing the solution
Let us now discuss the equilibrium solution above from an economic point of view, and the main question is if the result makes economic sense. Our claim is in fact that the result does not make economic sense, and to see this we recall that the equilibrium portfolio is given bŷ u(t, x) = 1 γ α − r σ 2 e −r(T −t) .
We now recall that the interpretation of the control u is that u t is the dollar amount that is invested in the risky asset at time t. From the expression forû we thus see that the dollar amount invested in the risky asset at time t is independent of the current wealth x. This is, in our view, economically unrealistic. The result implies that you will invest the same number of dollars in the stock if your wealth is 100 dollars as you would if your wealth is 100.000.000 dollars. Stated this way, it is clear that the equilibrium portfolio is economically unreasonable. We hasten to add that there is nothing surprising about the result -given the experience from the one-period mean variance model this particular result is quite expected. There is, however, a big conceptual difference between a one-period model and our multi-period model. In the one-period model one can argue that although the independence of initial wealth seems unreasonable at first sight, we can save the situation by noting that the risk aversion parameter γ should depend on the initial wealth. The obvious intuition is of course that γ should decrease with increasing wealth, so the person with initial wealth of 100 should have a much higher value of γ than a fund with 100.000.000 initial capital.
This idea is, in our view, perfectly reasonable in a one-period setting. It is also reasonable for the case of pre-committment, since then the perspective is clearly taken at time t = 0.
In our multi-period setting, however, and with our game theoretic formulation, we do have a problem, since in this setting there is no particular importance attached to the wealth at time t = 0. Instead, all points in time are of equal importance. We can of course choose our γ such that it reflects the risk version corresponding to the initial wealth x 0 . As time goes by, however, our wealth will change so when we come to time t the risk aversion coefficient γ which was appropriate for the initial wealth x 0 is no longer appropriate for the current wealth X t .
The natural conclusion of this discussion is, in our opinion, that we should explicitly allow the risk aversion parameter γ to be a function γ(x) of current wealth x. In the next section we will analyze this case.
Mean-variance with state dependent risk aversion
From the discussion in the previous section it is clear that we should extend the simple MV problem treated in [2] to the more realistic case when the reward functional is given by
where γ is a deterministic function of x. We now have two problems.
• Given a specific choice of γ(x), how do we compute the equilibrium strategy.
• Is there a particularly natural choice of the risk aversion function γ(x)?
To start with the first question, it is clear that the problem is perfectly fitted to be attacked by the extended HJB system in Definition 2.2. In fact, the reward functional can be written as
It is thus clear that we are within the general framework of [4] .
A natural choice of γ(x)
We now turn to the second question above, namely that of having a "natural" choice for γ(x). There are in fact two natural arguments, both leading to the same choice of γ(x).
1. One way of finding a natural candidate of γ is to perform a dimension analysis. In the reward function
we see that the first term E t,x [X 2 , so in order to have a reward function measured in dollars we have to choose γ in such a way that γ(x) has the dimension (dollar) −1 . The most obvious way to accomplish this is of course to specify γ as
where, with a slight abuse of notation, the occurrence of γ in the right hand side denotes a constant.
2. In the original single-period mean variance analysis, the mean variance utility function (with constant γ) is in fact not applied to the wealth, but rather to the return. More precisely this means that the objective function is given by
and we can write this as
It now follows from Corollary 2.1 that this objective functional will lead to the same equilibrium controlû as the objective functional
In the next subsection we will analyze the case of a general choice of γ(x) and obtain a fairly explicit result. In Section 4.3 we specialize to the case when γ(x) = γ/x, and for this case we obtain a more explicit solution, which is also reasonable form an economic point of view.
The case of a general γ(x)
Applying the general theory from Section 2.3 to the objective functional
gives us, after a large number of elementary calculations, the following result (see Appendix A for details).
Proposition 4.1
The extended HJB system takes the following form.
Remark 4.1 Note that, in (3), the partial derivatives of f and g should be evaluated at (t, x, x) and (t, x) respectively.
The HJB system above can in fact be simplified. We recall the probabilistic interpretations
From these it follows that
We thus have, always with f and its derivatives evaluated at (t, x, x),
Using these expressions, equation (3) takes the form
and the optimal u is easily obtained aŝ
We collect our results Lemma 4.1 With notation as above, the extended HJB system takes the form
The equilibrium control is given bŷ
Since the extended HJB system above gives us three equations involving only two unknown functions f and g, it now seems that we may have a potential problem with an over-determined system. This is, however, not the case. We recall that (6) is valid for all x and y, so in particular we can set y = x. We then have the system
This looks over-determined but by inspection we see that in fact (6) = (7) + γg · (8), so (6) is in fact implied by (6) and (6) . We can thus summarize the results so far.
Proposition 4.2
where the functions f and g are determined by the system
with boundary conditions
The equilibrium value function V is given by
The case γ(x) = γ x
We now move to the particularly interesting case when
In this special case we have
We now conjecture thatû is linear in x so we make the Ansatẑ
for some deterministic function c. If this is the case, then X will be GBM so we will have
for some deterministic functions a and b. We recall the probabilistic interpretations
This leads to the Ansatz
With this we have, withȧ = ∂a ∂t etc,
Plugging this into (9) gives us the equilibrium control aŝ
By separation of variables this leads to the following system of ODEṡ
Equation ( , the equilibrium control is given byû
where a and b solves the ODE systeṁ
An integral equation for c
The ODE system in Proposition 4.3 is highly nonlinear, and it does not satisfy the usual Lipschitz and growth conditions guaranteeing global existence and uniqueness of a solution, so we have a problem. Instead of analyzing a and b as above, an alternative approach is to focus directly on the function c in the Ansatzû(t, x) = c(t)x and to derive a single integral equation for c. Then we express a and b in terms of c.
Theorem 4.1 For the case γ(x) = γ x , the equilibrium control is given bŷ u(t, x) = c(t)x where c solves the integral equation
Proof. Underû(t, x) = c(t)x the wealth process X is GBM:
A direct computation shows that
Thus (16)- (17) follows from (13)- (14). From Proposition 4.3 we also have
and a simple calculation, using (16)- (17), gives us (15) .
The key question now is whether the integral equation (15) has a unique global solution. We assume from now on that β := α −r > 0 (the case β < 0 can be treated similarly). We also assume that γ > 0 which is economically reasonable. We use the standard notation C[0, T ] to denote the space of continuous functions on [0, T ] endowed with supremum norm. Proof. We construct a sequence c n ∈ C[0, T ] as follows
n = 1, 2, · · ·. We will now show that this sequence converges in C[0, T ], and this will be done in three steps.
Step 1: Prove that {c n } is uniformly bounded in C[0, T ].
Noting that γ > 0 we have
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Using this we also obtain
We have thus proved that
Step 2: Prove that {ċ n } is uniformly bounded in C[0, T ]. From the defining recursion it is obvious that c n is continuously differentiable for all n, and we obtaiṅ
Since {c n } is proved to be uniformly bounded, we conclude that {ċ n } is uniformly bounded.
Step 3: Prove existence and uniqueness for c. For any s, t ∈ [0, T ], and using the result from Step 2, we obtain
where K is a constant independent of n. Hence the sequence {c n } is equicontinuous and, since we have already proved uniform boundedness, the Arzela-Ascoli Theorem implies that there exists a c ∈ C[0, T ] and subsequence {c ni } such that c ni → c. Taking limits in (19) shows that c is a solution to (15) . To prove uniqueness, assume that c 1 and c 2 are two solutions to (15) . Noting that c 1 and c 2 are both bounded and that the function ϕ(x) = e x is globally Lipschitz on any given bounded set, we can show easily that
The Gronwal inequality now implies that c 1 ≡ c 2 .
Remark 4.2 The proof above shows that, for any subsequence of {c n } there is a further subsequence that converges to the same function c (which is the solution to (15) ). Thus {c n } itself converges to c.
A numerical algorithm for c
The next question is to find a numerical algorithm for the determination of c. The obvious idea is of course to implement the recursion scheme (18)- (19) numerically. From Remark 4.2 we know that the scheme converges to c, and the following result gives the speed of convergence. Theorem 4.3 Let {c n } be constructed according to (18) - (19) , and let c be the solution to (15) . Then we have
Proof. Letc n = c n − c n−1 . Them, with arguments as in the proof above, it is easy to show that
Denote ϕ n (t) = By induction we deduce ϕ n+1 (t) ≤ K n n! (T − t) n ϕ 1 (0).
It then follows from (20) that
|c n (t)| ≤ Kϕ n−1 (t) ≤ K n−1 (n − 2)! (T − t) n−2 ϕ 1 (0), and the stated result follows.
We now illustrate the results for the case γ(x) = γ x with various choices of γ, and for different time horizons. We have used the parameter values α = 0.12, σ = 0.2, r = 0.04. The function c, depicted in Figures 1 and 2 , has been calculated using the iterative scheme (19)- (19) . 
A Proof of Proposition 4.1
In order not to get swamped by details we write the wealth dynamics as dX t = µ(X t , u t )dt + σ(X t , u t )dW t , so we have, with obvious notation,
Note that in (21) , the function f and its derivatives should be evaluated as f(t, x, x) and similarly for f t , f x , and f xx . In (22)- (23) we have used the shorthand notationμ = µ(x,û(t, x)), σ = σ(x,û(t, x)).
We recall that in our case we have µ(x, u) = rx + (α − r)u, σ(x, u) = σu.
Using the notation β = α − r the extended HJB system is thus as follows,
f t (t, x, y) + (rx + βû) f x (t, x, y) + 1 2 σ 2û2 f xx (t, x, y) = 0,
g t (t, x) + (rx + βû) g x (t, x) + 1 2 σ 2û2 g xx (t, x) = 0.
Note the following
• In (24) the function f t and other f-derivatives should be evaluated as f t (t, x, x) etc.
• In (24), the function G x and other derivatives should be evaluated as G x (x, g(t, x)) etc.
For completeness we also recall the dynamics
Furthermore we have
G y (x, y) = γ(x)y, G xy (x, y) = γ (x)y, G yy (x, y) = γ(x).
Plugging these expressions for the G derivatives into the extended HJB proves Proposition 4.1.
